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NO. 36 JULY 2020 Introduction 
Corona Crisis and Political 
Confrontation in Brazil 
The President, the People, and Democracy under Pressure 
Claudia Zilla 
During his election campaign, Jair Bolsonaro promised economic recovery, the fight 
against corruption, and an iron hand against violent crime – today, these tasks rep-
resent the weak spots of the President: Brazil has become an epicentre of the Covid-19 
pandemic. Even though Bolsonaro downplays the situation and opposes containment 
measures, the virus and the chaotic crisis management are bringing about serious 
negative health, social, and economic consequences for the citizens. Investigations, in-
cluding those on corruption, and revelations about the Justice Minister who resigned 
are targeting the President and his family. While the homicide rate is on the rise 
again in 2020, Bolsonaro pleaded in a cabinet meeting for armed resistance from the 
population against the health protection policies in the federal states. Threatened 
by impeachment, the President is struggling for his political survival, challenging 
the rule of law and democratic principles. 
 
In Latin America, the Covid-19 pandemic 
began with a case of infection registered in 
Brazil on 26 February. The first officially 
known death in Brazil (the second in the 
region) occurred on 17 March. With a popu-
lation of around 210 million people, the 
country currently ranks second in the world 
(after the US) in terms of total number of 
both infections and deaths. The capitals 
of six federal states are severely affected: 
São Paulo (São Paulo), Rio de Janeiro (Rio 
de Janeiro), Fortaleza (Ceará), Belém (Pará), 
Manaus (Amazonas), and Recife (Pernam-
buco), where state hospitals are over-
crowded. Poverty, precarious working and 
housing conditions, a health system 
marked by major deficiencies, and the 
chaotic corona crisis management have 
contributed to the massive spread of the 
pandemic. 
The pandemic broke out in the context 
of a political crisis and has made it more 
visible. In addition to the strong political 
polarisation for and against the President 
and his confrontation with the other 
branches of government, there is now a 
dispute over the most appropriate corona 
crisis management within the cabinet, 
and above all between the President and 
the state governors. 
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The Health Care System 
After the re-democratisation of Brazil, the 
entitlement to health as a social right and 
task of the state as well as universal access 
to health care were anchored in the Con-
stitution of 1988. However, the latter is de 
facto not given due to the fragmentation of 
the health care system and the weakness 
of the state health sector. In surveys, Brazil-
ians traditionally state “health” as the most 
urgent problem. The country is also fre-
quently hit by epidemics; it currently regis-
ters the highest number (2.2 million) of 
dengue fever infections in the region. 
The health care system is divided into 
three parts. The state health system (Sis-
tema Único de Saúde, SUS) is financed by 
taxes and social security contributions. A 
network of territorially and hierarchically 
organised public institutions provides own 
services but also some that are purchased 
from the private sector. Around three quar-
ters of the population benefit from it. Sec-
ondly, a private sector provides health care 
to the remaining quarter of the population, 
which has greater purchasing power. It 
comprises both a direct payment system 
(ad hoc payments for the actual use of 
single services) and a supplementary system 
(Sistema de Atenção Médica Suplementar, 
SAMS), financed by family and corporate 
contributions through individual and cor-
porate health insurance schemes. Privately 
insured individuals occasionally turn to 
state hospitals (such as university hospitals) 
for complex or costly treatment. A third 
pillar of the health care system is the mili-
tary sector, whose facilities cater to both 
active and retired members of the armed 
forces and their families. 
In contrast to the private sector, the 
public health sector exhibits major deficits 
in financing and equipment. Because capac-
ities are limited, patients often must face 
long waiting times and travel long distances 
for medical appointments or treatments, 
even in acute cases. For every 10,000 people 
in Brazil, there are only 22 beds available 
in hospitals (both public and private) (Ger-
many: 83 beds), and only 0.8 in intensive 
care units, more than half of which are in 
private facilities. 
According to the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) of the United Nations (UN), 
Brazil allocated 10.3 per cent of total gov-
ernment spending for health care in 2017 
(DEU: 19.9 per cent). A 2019 survey by the 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE) shows that total per capita health 
spending in 2017 was around $1,000 (pur-
chasing power parity, PPP). Although this 
amount is considerable by Latin American 
standards, it remains well below $2,900 
(PPP), the average of all member countries 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD). In the period 
2010–2017, the total health expenditure 
in Brazil fluctuated between 7.8 and 9.3 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Pri-
vate actors assumed more than half of the 
costs; public health expenditure was within 
the low range of 3.4 to 4 per cent of GDP 
(Germany: 9.5 per cent). In the context of 
austerity measures adopted under the gov-
ernment of Michel Temer (2016–2018), 
public health care expenditure has been 
frozen for 20 years by constitutional 
amendment (EC95/2016), thus only adjust-
ments for inflation are allowed. In addition, 
after the first year of Bolsonaro’s presidency 
(January 2019–January 2020), the health 
budget has fallen by a further 4.3 per cent. 
Interpretation(s) of the 
Corona Crisis 
President Bolsonaro does not regard the 
crisis triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic 
as a public health or safety crisis, but (only) 
as a threat that could trigger an economic 
recession. For him, however, this recession 
would not be on account of the pandemic 
itself, but of the political management 
strategy to contain it, which he utterly 
rejects. This strategy is advocated by some 
members of his cabinet and many of the 
governors of the 26 federal states as well 
as by large segments of the population. 
As a right-wing populist with an anti-
establishment stance – and similar to US 
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President Donald Trump – Bolsonaro des-
pises the academic elite, expertise, and 
specialised international organisations such 
as WHO. He relativises the evidence-based 
findings on which these actors rely. He in-
stead portrays himself to be no less legiti-
mate than a specialist in human medicine 
or biology to declare his interpretation of 
Covid-19 (just a gripezinha: “minor cold”) in 
addition to strongly recommending treat-
ment using certain medications (such as the 
anti-malarial drug hydroxychloroquine) or 
putting forward the racist thesis that the 
Brazilian people are genetically superior 
and not prone to Covid-19. He also accuses 
the media of scaremongering. 
The reasons for Bolsonaro’s rejection of 
social quarantine are less to be found in a 
micro-sociological focus on specific groups 
of the population: namely all those in 
Brazil who depend on a daily wage from an 
informal job to buy food for the next day, 
or those who live in large families of three 
or four generations in a confined space. 
Meanwhile, he even accepts the lethality of 
Covid-19 in Brazil on the grounds that in 
the end we will all die. Although his middle 
name is Mesias, he cannot perform miracles 
(to slow down the pandemic). His argument 
is rather purely macroeconomic, true to the 
motto “the Brazilian economy first!” 
Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo’s inter-
pretation of the corona crisis is somewhat 
more complex and conspiratorial. In his 
blog “Metapolítica 17. Against Globalism”, 
in an article of 22 April entitled “Chegou 
o Comunavírus” (The communavirus has 
come), he provides his interpretation of the 
current situation. For this, he uses a series 
of quotations from the book Virus, which 
was digitally published in March 2020 by 
the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek. 
Araújo believes this book presents a totali-
tarian programme that serves as evidence of 
the communist intention to instrumentalise 
the coronavirus ideologically. 
Araújo is an admirer of Trump and is 
striving for better and closer relations with 
the US. Together with the US, Brazil should 
fight against the ideology of cultural Marx-
ism and the globalism linked to it, as they 
are both threatening the Christian Western 
civilisation – according to him. In his opin-
ion, today globalism has replaced socialism 
as a preliminary stage on the way to com-
munism. This communism-globalism is capi-
talising on the pandemic to undermine lib-
eral democracy and the market economy – 
according to Araújo’s terminology – and 
to enslave humans. The aim is to establish a 
world order without nation states and with-
out freedom. The elevation of WHO as a cen-
tralising international organisation thus 
constitutes a first step towards world-wide 
communist solidarity. 
Araújo strongly criticises political cor-
rectness, which he assesses as an instru-
ment of communism to control language, 
and ultimately to monitor thought and kill 
the human spirit. In addition, the more 
powerful instrument of “sanitary correct-
ness” emerges, since the coronavirus has 
created opportunities to oppress people. 
The Covid-19 pandemic is thus in line 
with other scaremongering tactics, some 
of which the Foreign Minister labels with 
neologisms: climatic alarmism, gender 
ideology, immigrationism, racialism, anti-
nationalism, and scientificism. Against this 
background, he concludes, it is necessary to 
fight for the health of the body and soul – 
but also against the parasite of the parasite, 
that is, against the coronavirus and the 
communavirus. 
In line with this – complemented by an 
anti-Chinese dimension – is the interpreta-
tion of the corona crisis by Abraham Wein-
traub, Education Minister until 18 June, 
who regards the pandemic as an infallible 
Chinese plan to dominate the world. Bolso-
naro’s son Eduardo, a national deputy for 
the federal state of São Paulo who is active 
in debating foreign policy issues, also con-
siders the coronavirus to be an Asian virus 
with a single culprit: the Communist Party 
of China. Such interpretations have led to 
diplomatic tensions with China – Brazil’s 
main trading partner – but also caused 
other actors such as the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies to publicly apologise 
for these accusations. 
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Chaotic Corona Management 
In Brazil there is no national approach to 
corona crisis management; there is a lack 
of central control by the government in 
Brasilia, and horizontal coordination be-
tween federal states is weak. The cabinet 
is split along the corona cleavage. The 
President boycotts the restrictive health 
protection and pandemic containment 
measures taken against his will by other 
authorities. For this reason, most state 
governors – many of them former Bolso-
naro supporters – are distancing them-
selves from him. In addition, the President 
has repeatedly clashed with the judiciary 
and the legislature, whose checks-and-balances 
function comes into play in the corona 
crisis. 
Already in early February, the then-
Minister of Health, Luiz Henrique Mandetta 
(a physician), declared a public health emer-
gency. He openly addressed the risk that, 
due to the pandemic, the health care sys-
tem could collapse soon, and he promoted 
the rapid expansion of capacities. Three 
issues cost him his office in mid-April: his 
plea for intensive communication to edu-
cate the population on Covid-19 and for 
spatial distancing; his reservations about 
the widespread use of hydroxychloroquine 
for the treatment of Covid-19, as recom-
mended by the President; and last but not 
least, the fact that he was more popular 
among the populace than Bolsonaro him-
self. As his successor, he appointed Nelson 
Teich (also a physician), who resigned a 
month later while concealing his reasons 
for doing so. Teich had appointed an army 
general, Eduardo Pazuello, as Executive 
Secretary, and thus number two in the 
ministerial hierarchy; the military official 
now heads the department ad interim. 
From March onwards, the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security (until mid-May 
under the direction of Sérgio Moro) ordered 
the partial and temporary closure of the 
borders, a measure that was successively 
extended in terms of both geographic area 
and duration. Furthermore, and among 
other directives, isolation and protection 
measures were introduced in the federal 
penal institutions. 
Since the end of January, executives on 
the state and municipal levels have been 
taking various and increasingly restrictive 
measures to limit public life. Thus, they 
have departed from the President’s instruc-
tions and provoked him to start an aggres-
sive campaign against their corona crisis 
management. 
In a cabinet meeting on 22 April – a 
revealing recording of which was made pub-
lic due to a decision by a federal judge – 
Bolsonaro fervently argued that he wanted 
to arm the entire populace to defend them-
selves against dictatorship (meant of the 
governors). In this male-dominated round 
(there are only two women in the 22-mem-
ber Cabinet of Ministers), the Minister 
for Women, Families, and Human Rights, 
Damares Alves, condemned the corona 
crisis management approach of the gover-
nors and mayors. The evangelical pastor, 
who is a passionate opponent of feminism 
as well as the legalisation of abortion, 
promised that she would put behind bars 
those who are responsible for social quar-
antine as well as for its enforcement, which 
violates human rights. For his part, Wein-
traub, who is now moving to the World 
Bank, declared that he was fighting for free-
dom alongside the people. He confessed 
that he wanted to get rid of “the shit that 
Brasilia is”, “a cancer of corruption, of privi-
leges”. He wanted the arrest of all these 
“tramps” of the capital, “starting with the 
Supreme Court”. 
Bolsonaro is also facing headwinds from 
the judiciary: In March, a federal judge 
granted a request from the public prosecu-
tor’s office and banned Bolsonaro from 
running a campaign for the normalisation 
of public life in Brazil. This prevented the 
official release of the video advertisement 
“Brasil não pode parar” (Brazil cannot stop). 
In April, the Supreme Court unanimously 
ruled in favour of the states and munici-
palities, confirming their constitutional 
authority to impose health protection meas-
ures. Previously, the President had tried to 
stop the closure of airports and interstate 
 SWP Comment 36 
 July 2020 
 5 
roads by decree. In the same month, the 
federal judiciary authorised the city of São 
Paulo to suspend its debt repayment to the 
federal government for six months in order 
to be able to use the released resources to 
fight the pandemic. In June, at the request 
of opposition parties, a judge on the Su-
preme Court issued a temporary injunction 
against Bolsonaro’s decision to no longer 
make the (extremely high) total number of 
Covid-19 infections public, but only daily 
totals. 
In the meantime, the Brazilian Parlia-
ment had already announced its intention 
to monitor and publish the total number of 
cases of the virus. In general, the President 
of the Senate, Davi Alcolumbre (who tested 
positive for Covid-19 in March), and the 
President of the Chamber of Deputies, 
Rodrigo Maia, have publicly expressed their 
sympathies. For example, on 9 May they 
arranged three days of national mourning 
to commemorate the first 10,000 corona 
deaths in Brazil. They acknowledge the 
health challenges posed by the pandemic – 
and also the economic side-effects: Congress 
declared a state of disaster on 20 March 
(PDL 88/20), only two days after Bolsonaro 
had made the motion (Mensagem No. 93). 
This allows for extra expenditures beyond 
the approved state budget, provided that 
they are related to the Covid-19 pandemic 
and occur by the end of the year. 
Economic Impact 
This crisis event and crisis management are 
altering demand and supply on the national 
and international levels. Both the pandemic 
itself and the political handling of it have 
negative economic consequences, for exam-
ple those caused by illness or self-isolation 
as well as by the imposed quarantine or 
border closures. All this prevents people 
from participating in the labour and con-
sumer market. According to the assessment 
of the UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), other 
interrelated factors have a negative impact 
on Brazil (and many Latin American coun-
tries): (1) the decline in the economic activ-
ity of the main trading partners, first and 
foremost China, and thus the decline in 
exports; (2) the fall in the price of commod-
ities, the main export product; (3) the in-
terruption of global value chains for the 
industrial sector, the largest in the region; 
(4) the rising risk aversion and tighter inter-
national financial conditions; (5) the depre-
ciation of the national currency, that is, the 
real against the dollar. For 2020, Brazil is 
expected to experience negative economic 
growth of 5.2 per cent. 
The government and Parliament have 
adopted a series of economic aid measures. 
According to CEPAL calculations, these 
measures together represent only 4.6 per 
cent of Brazil’s GDP. The remedies are 
aimed at strengthening the health sector, 
supporting precarious households, helping 
financially weak workers in the formal and 
informal sectors, and protecting enterprises 
(especially small and medium-sized ones). 
The aid consists, among other things, of 
increased, expanded, and new financial 
transfers, the distribution of food and medi-
cines, and the provision of free services. 
However, various circumstances have hin-
dered this assistance from reaching the 
target populations: poverty; a significant 
proportion of the population being outside 
the banking system (30 per cent of adults); 
a large informal sector (around 41 per cent 
of the labour market and 17 per cent of 
GDP); and widespread corruption. 
Even before the outbreak of the pandemic, 
Brazil’s economic situation was anything 
but rosy. Since 2017, annual economic 
growth has been between 1.3 and 1.1 per 
cent. Due to a historic budget deficit, the 
Brazilian government’s public debt in 2019 
amounted to 75.8 per cent of GDP. The 
political instability and damage to Brazil’s 
international image that Bolsonaro has in-
flicted – and continues to inflict – on the 
brand Brasil are discouraging foreign invest-
ment. 
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The Perception of the Situation 
in Society 
Meanwhile, the population’s concern about 
the situation is growing. Although the 
first cases of infection had been registered 
among the higher social classes that travel 
internationally, the virus is now seeping 
down through the social pyramid and 
spreading rapidly across the bottom. The 
pandemic and many crisis management 
measures are distributed unequally along 
structural asymmetries and are exacerbat-
ing them. Extremely vulnerable to the 
spread of the pandemic are the densely 
populated slums (favelas), where sanitary 
conditions are poor and organised crime 
frequently dictates the management of 
the corona crisis. Inmates are exposed to a 
similar risk, since prisons – where poor 
and black citizens are overrepresented, and 
human right violations occur on a daily 
basis – are operating at 168 per cent of 
their capacity. 
In a survey conducted by Datafolha in 
May, 45 per cent of those surveyed said they 
were very afraid of becoming infected with 
Covid-19. The map of fear corresponds to 
the geography of social inequality in Brazil: 
More women (51 per cent) than men (38 per 
cent) are very afraid; the poor (50 per cent) 
more than the rich (35 per cent); those liv-
ing in the poorer north-east (51 per cent) 
more than those from the richer south (35 
per cent). When asked for their assessments 
of Bolsonaro’s statements on the pandemic, 
a large majority (89 per cent) responded 
that the use of hydroxychloroquine as a 
treatment option should be the decision of 
health professionals and not policymakers. 
Furthermore, the majority disagreed that 
people should be armed in order not to be 
enslaved (71 per cent). 
Also in May, Datafolha registered the 
worst approval ratings for Bolsonaro since 
he took office: 43 per cent rated his govern-
ance as poor, 22 per cent as mediocre, and 
33 per cent as good. 
The strong political polarisation around 
the figure of Bolsonaro shapes society and 
is also evident in the streets. On the one 
hand, a significant mobilisation took place 
on 19 April, Armed Forces Day in Brazil, 
when Covid-19 infections skyrocketed. The 
President’s supporters demonstrated in 
several cities across the country, calling for 
the closure of the Parliament and the Su-
preme Court and for the introduction of a 
military dictatorship with Bolsonaro at its 
head. He joined the mobilisation in Brasilia 
and improvised an ambiguous populist 
speech, which was broadcast live via social 
media, in front of the Armed Forces Head-
quarters. It was once again military figures, 
such as Defence Minister General Fernando 
Azevedo, who subsequently reaffirmed the 
commitment of the armed forces to democ-
racy and the full application of the Consti-
tution. Some 3,000 active and retired mem-
bers of the armed forces occupy civilian 
positions in present-day Brazil. 
On the other hand, protests against 
Bolsonaro have been raging since March: 
Domestic panelaços – loud pot banging 
from windows, balconies, and terraces – 
express dissatisfaction with his corona crisis 
management, mostly in middle-class neigh-
bourhoods. People have also taken to the 
streets against the demands for a military 
dictatorship and in defence of democracy. 
But no large crowds have taken part in the 
pro and contra demonstrations – possibly 
due to the pandemic – and the opposing 
groups seem to be roughly in balance: In an 
April Datafolha survey, 45 per cent of those 
interviewed were in favour of Congress 
initiating an impeachment process against 
the President, 48 per cent were against it. 
The Spectre of Impeachment 
The debate about possible impeachment 
proceedings against Bolsonaro has inten-
sified since Sérgio Moro, head of the Minis-
try for Justice and Public Security, left the 
government on 24 April. In his resignation 
speech, he accused the President of attempt-
ing to interfere in the personnel policy of 
the federal police in order to slow the in-
vestigations into his own family. Bolsonaro 
reacted by making a public appearance, 
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throughout which he spent a good 45 
minutes on dismissing Moro’s accusations 
and harshly criticising him. During this 
time, almost the entire cabinet was lined 
up behind him. 
The enmity between the two men be-
comes particularly explosive in light of 
the fact that Moro, as a federal judge, had 
strongly promoted the criminal proceedings 
in Operação Lava Jato. These trials influ-
enced the public’s mood to move in favour 
of Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment. They 
also provided the basis for the conviction 
of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his banish-
ment from the list of candidates in the 
2018 presidential elections. 
The federal judiciary took Moro’s state-
ments as a reason to investigate Bolsonaro. 
In this context, in May it published the 
video of the cabinet meeting that had taken 
place two days before Moro’s resignation. It 
shows a very irritated Bolsonaro, who, with 
crude language and a raised voice, promises 
that he will not simply allow his family and 
friends to be “harmed” just because he can-
not replace someone in the security sector; 
if he were not able to, he would just replace 
his or her boss, or even the minister. Among 
others, Bolsonaro’s son Carlos, a member 
of Rio de Janeiro’s City Council, is currently 
under investigation. He allegedly led a 
criminal network to disseminate fake news 
in the 2018 presidential election campaign, 
which could provide the judiciary with the 
justification to annul the elections. Bolso-
naro’s personnel policy, with which he is 
trying to influence investigations, as well as 
his corona policy are the main arguments 
currently being used by those who are advo-
cating impeachment. This is the case of the 
impeachment motion filed by the Workers’ 
Party (PT) in March – the 35th against Bol-
sonaro. However, an impeachment motion 
only has a chance of success if the President 
of the Chamber of Deputies and then a 
special committee consider it before accept-
ing, thereby initiating the impeachment 
process. 
The Corona Crisis As a 
Magnifying Glass 
The corona crisis is currently neither spread-
ing authoritarianism in Latin America (the 
number of authoritarian regimes in the 
region has continued to remain stable) nor 
currently deepening it in the case of Brazil, 
as there is no evidence of increasingly authori-
tarian governance in connection with the 
pandemic (for a different position on this, 
see SWP Comments 35/2020). Bolsonaro’s 
authoritarian and right-wing populist 
views, arguments, and actions are not a 
recent phenomenon but have been well-
known since his election campaign – and 
they continue to resonate deeply among 
parts of society. Also, the outbreak of 
the pandemic has not correlated with an 
increase in repressive measures by the 
national government. This is because the 
President relativises the health hazards 
posed by Covid-19, cultivates a purely 
macroeconomic interpretation of the corona 
crisis, and has therefore neither declared 
a state of emergency nor imposed curfews. 
Instead, he boycotts the corona restrictions 
that are introduced by governors and 
recommended by other institutions. 
The corona crisis is embedded in a con-
frontational political context that preceded 
it. However, cracks in Bolsonaro’s camp and 
institutional conflicts are now becoming 
more palpable in the crisis. The pandemic 
is revealing the limits of certain political 
alliances, for example, as it is raising the 
costs for governors to continue their alli-
ances with Bolsonaro (whose poll ratings 
are falling) or follow the isolationist and 
anti-Chinese foreign policy approach of 
Foreign Minister Araújo. The corona crisis 
thus increases the pressure on them to dis-
tance themselves from the executive branch 
in Brasilia. Such a dissociation is institu-
tionally possible, or being made possible. 
This includes the intensified foreign policy 
activity of the state governments, which 
had already begun in 2019 with governors 
travelling to China and the establishment 
of state agencies for foreign trade and loca-
tion marketing in Asia. Now the governors 
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are seeking to exchange experiences 
with – and get aid from – China. 
However, the vertical and horizontal 
confrontations (not only corona-induced) 
are evidence of the diffusion of power 
through federalism and the separation of 
powers – whether the motives of the actors 
involved are republican or opportunistic, 
oriented towards the common good or par-
ticularistic. 
The President, who left the Social Liberal 
Party (PSL) at the end of last year to found 
the (still insignificant) Alliance for Brazil, is 
losing political support, repeatedly encoun-
tering resistance from the legislature and 
judiciary, and falling into the looming dark 
shadow of a dramatic economic situation, 
growing violent crime, and allegations of 
corruption. The spectre of impeachment 
even made him break another election cam-
paign promise, namely not to seek parlia-
mentary majorities by means of co-opta-
tion. Now he hopes to gain political support 
of the Centrão, a heterogeneous group of 
“pragmatic” parties that take the best offer, 
by handing over positions with access to 
financial resources. 
Nevertheless, a successful impeachment 
procedure seems unlikely at present for 
various reasons. The constitutionally re-
quired two-thirds majority in both cham-
bers of Congress represents a very high 
hurdle in view of the strong party fragmen-
tation (with 30 parties in Parliament). The 
largest opposition party, the PT, has only 
about 10 per cent of the seats in Parlia-
ment; moreover, it would potentially fare 
better in elections following a (chaotic) 
Bolsonaro government than if, after a suc-
cessful impeachment, former general and 
current Vice President Hamilton Mourão 
were to complete Bolsonaro’s term of office. 
In addition, the massive level of public 
pressure for encouraging impeachment 
is lacking as of now, although the public 
demand for it, the legal justification for its 
commencement, and the political motiva-
tion of the members of Congress for its im-
plementation are often at odds with each 
other (as in the case of Rousseff). Neverthe-
less, social pressure commonly turns into 
a tailwind for Congress, or it acts in its slip-
stream. But old and new enemies of Bolso-
naro do not trust each other and are not 
building a united opposition today. Last but 
not least, there is a lack of experience – 
or perhaps instead a lack of imagination – 
in envisaging an impeachment process in 
the midst of a corona crisis. 
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